For years, Hezbollah has relied on pagers as a means of communication, opting for the older technology over cellphones to avoid being tracked by Israeli intelligence. The group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has even warned members not to carry cellphones due to concerns that Israel could use them to monitor movements. Pagers, which operate on a different wireless network than mobile phones, have long been seen as a more secure alternative, especially given the sophisticated electronic surveillance systems believed to be in place in Lebanon.
However, the reliance on pagers has now turned deadly. In a series of coordinated explosions on Tuesday, several pager devices detonated, causing significant casualties among Hezbollah members. The explosions have sparked concerns over the potential infiltration of Hezbollah’s supply chain by a foreign actor.
Taiwanese and Hungarian Companies Linked to Pager Supply Chain
Elijah J. Magnier, a veteran political risk analyst based in Brussels, has reported that the pagers used in Tuesday’s attacks were part of a newer batch procured more than six months ago. The exact route through which the pagers arrived in Lebanon remains unclear. Taiwan-based Gold Apollo, whose brand name was found on the AR-924 pager models used in the explosions, claimed that it had authorized the use of its brand but had no direct involvement in the devices’ shipment to Lebanon.
According to Gold Apollo, a Budapest-based company, BAC Consulting KFT, produced and sold the pagers, acting as an intermediary. Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs confirmed that no direct exports of the pagers to Lebanon had been recorded. Hungarian authorities later stated that the devices never physically passed through Hungary, deepening the mystery surrounding their origins.
Suspicions of Knock-Off Devices Surface
Further complicating the investigation, Ray Novak, a senior sales manager for Icom, a Japanese manufacturer of wireless radio devices, told the Associated Press that the radio units used in the explosions appeared to be knock-offs of the Icom IC-V82 model. “I can guarantee you they were not our products,” Novak stated in an interview during a trade show in Providence, Rhode Island. Icom further confirmed that production of the IC-V82 had ceased nearly a decade ago and that the devices used in the attack did not carry the anti-counterfeit hologram that all legitimate Icom devices bear.
Possible Sabotage Involving Explosive Devices
Experts have begun to speculate on how the pager devices could have been rigged to explode. A former British Army bomb disposal officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, explained that a pager already contains several components necessary for an explosive device, including a battery, container, and triggering mechanism. “You would only need to add the detonator and the charge,” the ex-officer said.
Sean Moorhouse, a former British Army officer and explosive ordnance expert, pointed to the potential involvement of a state actor, specifically Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency. Moorhouse emphasized that the complexity and scale of the operation would require significant resources and expertise, making Mossad a likely suspect. Israel has a history of carrying out similar covert operations, often involving advanced electronic devices.
Hezbollah’s Internal Investigation and Israel’s Alleged Role
Hezbollah has launched an internal investigation to determine the nature of the explosives used in the devices. According to Magnier, the group suspects that the explosives may have included RDX or PETN, both highly potent materials capable of causing extensive damage with as little as 3 to 5 grams. There are also concerns that the devices may have contained GPS systems that allowed Israeli intelligence to track Hezbollah’s movements.
A Hezbollah official, speaking anonymously, confirmed that the group has strong evidence pointing to Mossad’s involvement in the attack. “We have solid evidence that Mossad is behind it,” the official stated. The investigation is focusing on the supply chain and the role of intermediaries like BAC Consulting KFT in the production and distribution of the pagers. The official also revealed that Hezbollah members had sent their pagers for maintenance prior to the attack, reporting issues such as signal failures and message delivery problems. Not all of the devices exploded, which is adding to the group’s concerns over potential defects or pre-existing sabotage.
State Actor Involvement and Future Concerns
The sophistication of the attack suggests it had been planned for an extended period, with estimates ranging from several months to two years. Nicholas Reese, an adjunct instructor at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs, explained that the perpetrator would have had to gather intelligence over time, establish relationships to gain access to the pagers, and develop the technology to remotely trigger the explosions.
The broader implications of this incident are significant, as it raises concerns about supply-chain security and the possibility of further infiltration into Hezbollah’s communications. With the investigation ongoing and reports of more devices exploding, Hezbollah’s leadership is now grappling with the reality that their once-reliable means of communication may have become a dangerous liability.
Hezbollah has since deployed special units to investigate the explosions and safeguard against further attacks. The group remains on high alert as it continues to assess the extent of the infiltration and seeks to prevent future incidents.
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