During the peak of the Kargil war, Gen Pervez Musharraf, then Chief of the Army Staff under Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, visited Beijing. Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz Khan, his trusted Chief of the General Staff, contacted him at his Beijing hotel, informing him about a meeting chaired by Nawaz Sharif. At this meeting, the heads of the Pakistani Air Force and Navy expressed their concerns to Nawaz, stating that Musharraf had kept them unaware of the invasion of Kargil Heights. This conversation was intercepted by R&AW.
Kargil tape is counted among R&AW’s most successful psychological warfare (PSYWAR) operations. It provided evidence that the intruders were regular Pakistani Army soldiers, not jihadi terrorists as initially claimed by Musharraf. The tape also revealed that Musharraf didn’t trust his own Air Force and Navy Chiefs or Lt Gen Ziauddin, the then ISI chief, and exposed internal disagreements within the Army regarding Musharraf’s actions.
After deliberation, the Government of India decided to release the tape to the public. They aimed to inform Nawaz Sharif and share it with other nations. At a press conference, the NDA government distributed transcripts of the tape, and through backchannel means, Nawaz Sharif was made aware of its contents. Full transcripts of the conversation were also provided to foreign embassies in New Delhi.
External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh released transcripts of conversations. The minister stated that the two tapes and their transcripts had been authenticated through both voice and print verification.
The discussions covered various conflict-related issues, including the downing of the Mi-17 helicopter on May 28 and Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz’s visit to New Delhi the following day.
First Recording
P: How is the visit going?
C: Yes, very well, Okay. And, what else is the news on that side?
P: Ham-dul-ullah. There is no change on the ground situation. They have started rocketing and straffing. That has been upgraded a little. It has happened yesterday also and today. Today high altitude bombing has been done.
C: On their side, in those positions?
P: In those positions, but in today’s bombing about three bombs landed on our side of the Line of control. No damage, Sir.
C: Is it quite a lot?
P: Sir, about 12-13 bombs were dropped, from which three fell on our side, which does not appear to be a result of inaccuracy. In my interpretation, it is a sort of giving of a message that if need be, we can do it on the other side as well. It is quite distance apart. Where the bombs have been dropped, they have tried to drop from a good position where they are in difficulty, from behind the LoC but they have fallen on our side of the LoC. So I have spoken to the Foreign Secretary and I have told him that he should make the appropriate noises about this in the Press.
C: They (Indians) should also be told.
P: That we have told, Foreign Secretary will also say and Rashid will also say. He will not, generally speaking, make any such mistake about those other bombs falling on the other side, our stand should be that all these bombs are falling on our side. We will not come into that situation. The guideline that they have given, we have stressed that we should say that this build-up and employment of air strike which has been done under the garb of….us (?), actually they are targetting our position on the LoC and our logistic build-up, these possibly they are taking under the garb having intention for operation the craft (?) Line of Control, and this need to be taken note of and we would retaliate in kind…. is what happened? So, the entire build-up we want to give this colour.
C: Absolutely okay. Yes, this is better. After that, has there been any talk with them? Any meetings etc?
P: Yeserday, again, in the evening.
C: Who all were there?
P: Actually, we insisted that a meeting should be held, because otherwise that friend of ours, the incumbent of my old chair, we thought lest he give some interpretation of his own, we should do something ourselves by going there.
C: Was he little disturbed. I heard that there was some trouble in Sialkot.
P: Yes, There was one in Daska. On this issue there was trouble. Yes, he was little disturbed about that but I told him that such small things keep happening and we can reply to such things in a better way.
C: Absolutely.
P: There is no such thing to worry.
C: So that briefing to Mian Seheb that we did, was the forum the same as where we had done previously? There, at Jamshed’s place?
P: No. In Mian Saheb’s office.
C: Oh I see. There. What was he saying?
P: From here we had gone — Choudhary Zafar Saheb, Mehmood, myself & Tauqir. Because before going, Tauqir had spoken with his counterpart. We carried that tape with us.
C: So, what was he (Indian counterpart) saying?
P: That is very interesting. When you come, I will play it for you. Its focus was that these infiltrators, who are sitting here, they have your help and artillery support, without which they could not have come to J&K. This is not a very friendly act and it is against the spirit of the Lahore Declaration. Then Tauqir told him that if your boys tried to physically attack the Line of Control and go beyond it….and that the bombs were planted on the Turtok bridge and the dead body received in the process was returned with military honours and I said, I thought that there wan good enough indication you would not enter into this type of misadventure, and all this build-up that you are doing — one or more brigade strength and 50-60 aircraft are being collected. These are excuses for undertaking some operations against the verious spaces, so I had put him on the defensive. Then he said the same old story. He would put three points again and again that they (militants) should not be supported, and without your support they could not be there, they have sophisticated weapons and we will flush them out, we will not let them stay there. But this is not a friendly act.
C: So, did they talk of coming out and meeting somewhere?
P: No, No, they did not.
C: Was there some other talk of putting pressure on us?
P: No. He only said that they (militants) will be given suitable reception. This term he used. He said they will be flushed out, and everytime Tauqir said that please tell us some detail, detail about how many have gone into your area, what is happening there? Then I will ask the concerned people and then we will get back to you. So whenever he asked these details, he would say, we will talk about this when we meet, then I will give details. This means, they are possibly looking forward to the next round of talks, in which the two sides could meet. This could be the next round of talks between the two PMs which they are expecting it….Sir, very good thing, no problem…
C: So, many times we had discussed, taken your (PM’s?…) blessings and yesterday also I told him that the door of discussion, dialogue must be kept open & rest, no change in ground situation.
P: So, no one was in a particularly disturbed, frame of mind.
C: Even your seat man?
P: Yes, he was disturbed. Also, Malik Saheb was disturbed, as they had been even earlier. Those two’s views were that the status quo & the present postion of Gen Hassan (?) no change should be recommended in that. But he was also saying that any escalation after that should be regulated as there may be the danger of war. On this logic, we gave the suggestion that there was no such fear as the scruff (tooti) of their (militants) neck is in our hands, whenever you want, we could regulate it. Ch Zafar Saheb coped very well. He gave a very good presentation of our viewpoint. He said we had briefed the PM earlier & given an assessment. AFter this, we played the tape of Tauqir. Then he said that what we are seeing, that was our assessment, and those very stages of the military situation were being seen, which it would not be a problem for us to handle. Rest, it was for your guidance how to deal with the political & diplomatic aspects. We told him there is no reason of alarm & panic. Then he said that when I came to know seven days back, when Corps Commanders were told. The entire reason of the success of this oepration was this total secrecy. Our experience was that our earlier efforts failed because of lack of secrecy. So the top priority is to accord confidentiality, to ensure our success. We should respect this and the advantage we have from this would give us a handle.
C: Rest (baki), is Mian Saheb okay?
P: Ok. He was confident just like that but for the other two. Shamshad as usual was supporting. Today, for the last two hours the BBC has been continuously reporting on the air strikes by India. Keep using this — let them keep dropping bombs. As far as internationalisation is concerned, this is the fastest this has happened. You may have seen in the press about UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s appeal that both countries should sit & talk.
