After 47 years, Bangladesh and Pakistan have resumed direct maritime relations with the arrival of a Pakistani freight ship from Karachi at Chittagong port on Wednesday, November 13. This action, which was applauded by Muhammad Yunus’s interim government in Bangladesh, has raised security worries in India, especially with reference to possible destabilization in the Northeast. Because Chittagong is so close to India—roughly 225 kilometers from Agartala, Tripura, and 75 kilometers from the Mizoram border—security experts are concerned that the port may be used to funnel support to insurgent organizations active in northeastern India.
Chittagong Port: A History of Security Concerns
In the past, the Chittagong port has been a conduit for arms smuggling, with militant groups such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) allegedly using it to receive shipments of weapons. The recent re-opening of the port to Pakistani ships has raised significant concerns once again indicating that Pakistan may turn towards Chittagong to make it pakistan’s a strategic entry point to enable insurgencies and undermine India’s security in the North East. “Chittagong and its hinterland can easily be used by Pakistan as a beachhead to create trouble in North East India,” sources indicate, echoing worries in the Indian strategic community.
Historical Tensions and Pakistan’s Influence in Bangladesh
Direct maritime links between Bangladesh and Pakistan had ceased since 1971, following Bangladesh’s independence. The devastating violence against Bengalis, both Hindus and Muslims, during the Liberation War remains etched in Bangladesh’s collective memory, yet pro-Pakistan sentiments persist among certain factions. Influential groups, including some Islamists within Bangladesh’s armed forces and bureaucracy, have periodically advocated for stronger ties with Pakistan. These groups gained significant influence during the regimes of Bangladesh’s military rulers and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), when Pakistan allegedly provided training and arms to North East Indian insurgents.
Under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina, these activities were curtailed. Hasina’s government worked to curtail Pakistan’s influence, cracking down on North East Indian militants sheltered in Bangladesh and handing some over to India. However, after Hasina’s ousting on August 5, the interim government, led by Yunus, has made overtures to Pakistan, promising to restore ties. Observers note a surge in pro-Pakistan and Islamist influence within Yunus’s government, with notable figures advocating for closer economic and military alliances with Pakistan.
Yunus’s Pro-Pakistan Tilt and Its Implications
In recent months, Yunus has made statements in support of Pakistan, including an endorsement of Pakistan’s call to revive the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which has largely been inactive due to India’s policy of non-engagement with Pakistan over terrorism concerns. Yunus’s push for SAARC’s revival has been viewed by Indian officials as an attempt to irritate India and challenge its stance on counter-terrorism. However, his ambitions appear to extend further: insiders report that Yunus has been quietly pursuing closer military and strategic ties with Pakistan.
Many of Yunus’ advisors and the influential Islamists in his government . have openly advocated that Bangladesh should be on the same side as Pakistan and China, which they describe as a “Beijing-Islamabad-Dhaka axis.” An association like this would offset an Indian hegemony in the region; this is their rationale. It has been reported that the Islamists and anti-India elements in Bangladesh are devising ways to demoralize the North East of India. This feeling has been emboldened by Hasina’s exit.
Limited Trade but Significant Security Concerns
Despite such pomp and fanfare over the arrival of ships from Pakistan, it is seen that Bangladesh-Pakistan trade volume is pretty insignificant. Bangladesh exports jute and textile fibers to Pakistan, while the amount of the value trade is around $75 million. On the other hand, the country imports yarns, cement, copper, etc., valued at almost $840 million. According to the industry people, the trade volume doesn’t attract any direct shipping route to cover up the 4,600 nautical miles distance between Karachi and Chittagong.
Previously, goods traded between the two countries would travel on vessels from other countries that made stops at both ports as part of larger routes. For instance, a container ship en route to South East Asia would offload Pakistani cargo at Chittagong. Given the low volume and nature of the trade, reestablishing exclusive maritime links between Bangladesh and Pakistan raises questions, particularly regarding potential non-commercial uses.
Security Risks and India’s Stand
Indian officials are known to be monitoring the situation following this development. New Delhi is worried regarding the risks this might pose to its security, especially if Pakistan, at the encouragement of pro-Pakistani forces in Bangladesh, tries to reinvigorate support for insurgencies in North East India. “India cannot but ignore the security repercussions of these latest developments,” said an official while underlining that the reestablishment of direct links with Pakistan could heighten the risk of insurgency in the North East.
Indian strategists suggest that New Delhi should make its stand clear to the Yunus government and hold it accountable if any security threats surfacing from this revival of relations with Pakistan comes into existence. They also draw attention towards the fact that India has the might and resolve to respond strongly if such an alliance hampers India’s security interests.
